We consider pricing problems when customers choose according to the generalized extreme value (GEV) models and the products have the same price sensitivity parameter. First, we consider the static pricing problem, where we maximize the expected profit obtained from each customer. We show that the optimal prices of the different products have a constant markup over their unit costs. We provide an explicit formula for the optimal markup in terms of the Lambert-W function. This result holds for any arbitrary GEV model. Second, we consider single-resource dynamic pricing problems. We show that as we have more resource inventory or as we have fewer time periods left until the end of the selling horizon, the prices charged by the optimal policy decrease. Third, we consider dynamic pricing problems over a network of resources. We focus on a price-based deterministic approximation with prices as the decision variables, but this deterministic approximation fails to be a convex program. We transform the price-based deterministic approximation to an equivalent market-share-based deterministic approximation, with purchase probabilities as the decision variables. Surprisingly, the transformed problem is a convex program, and the gradient of its objective function can be computed efficiently. Computational experiments show that the market-share-based formulation provides substantial advantages over the original price-based formulation.
Introduction
In most revenue management settings, customers make a choice among the set of products that are offered for purchase. While making their choices, customers substitute among the products based on attributes such as price, quality, and richness of features. In these situations, increasing the price for one product may shift the demand of other products, and such substitutions create complex interactions among the demands for the different products. There is a growing body of literature pointing out that capturing the choice process of customers and the interactions among demands for the different products through discrete choice models can significantly improve operational decisions; see, for example, Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) , Gallego et al. (2004) , and Vulcano et al. (2010) . Nevertheless, as the discrete choice models become more complex, finding the optimal prices to charge for the products becomes more difficult as well. In particular, the challenge reflects the fundamental tradeoff between choice model complexity and operational tractability.
In this paper, we study three classes of fundamental pricing problems when customers make purchases according to a choice model from the generalized extreme value (GEV) family. The GEV family is very broad, as it encapsulates many widely studied discrete choice models as special cases, including the multinomial logit (Hanson and Martin 1996) , nested logit Huh 2011, Wang 2012) , d-level logit Huh 2015) , and paired combinatorial logit (Li and Webster 2015) . Throughout this paper, when we refer to a GEV model, we refer to an arbitrary choice model within the GEV family. For all three classes of pricing problems studied in this paper, we consider the case where different products share the same price sensitivity parameter, and we present results that hold simultaneously for all GEV models.
Our Contributions: First, we study the static pricing problem, where the goal is to set prices for the products to maximize the expected profit from each customer. The profit from each product is equal to its price minus its unit cost. We show that the optimal prices of the different products have the same markup, and we provide an explicit formula for the optimal markup in terms of the Lambert-W function; see Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2. These results greatly simplify the computation of the optimal prices. We give comparative statistics to describe how the optimal prices change as a function of the unit costs. These results hold for any GEV model. Second, we focus on dynamic pricing problems with a single resource, where we offer multiple products that all consume the inventory of a single resource. Customers arrive into the system one by one and choose among the products. The sale of a product consumes one unit of the resource. The goal is to dynamically adjust the prices for the products to maximize the total expected revenue over the selling horizon. By using our comparative statistics for the static pricing problem, we show that as we have more remaining resource inventory or as we have fewer time periods left until the end of the selling horizon, the optimal prices decrease; see Theorem 4.1.
Third, we study dynamic pricing problems over a network of resources, where we offer multiple products, each using a different combination of resources. The problem is similar to the single-resource dynamic pricing problem, except that the sale of a product consumes the inventory of multiple resources. Computing the exact optimal policy here requires solving a dynamic program with a high-dimensional state variable that keeps track of the remaining inventory for each resource, which is computationally intractable because of the curse of dimensionality. We adopt a popular approach based on a price-based deterministic approximation.
In the price-based deterministic approximation, the decision variables are the prices for the products. This deterministic approximation assumes that the demand for the products takes on its expected value and maximizes the expected revenue subject to the constraint that the expected consumption of each resource does not exceed the inventory of the resource. Unfortunately, the objective function of this problem is not concave, and the set of feasible prices is not convex. Surprisingly, we can transform the price-based deterministic approximation to an equivalent market-share-based one, where the decision variables are the purchase probabilities of the products. We show that the transformed problem is a convex program, with a concave objective function and a polyhedral feasible region; see Theorem 5.4. In addition, we show how to compute the gradient of the objective function efficiently. So, we can use standard convex programming methods to solve the market-share-based deterministic approximation. Lastly, we show that we can recover the optimal prices to the original price-based formulation by using the optimal solution to the market-share-based one. In general, our result shows that the expected revenue under any GEV model with homogeneous price sensitivities is concave in the purchase probabilities.
Positioning our work in the context of related literature, the strength of our contributions derives from the fact that our results hold under any GEV model. We provide effective solution methods for both the static and dynamic pricing problems that are applicable to every choice model in the GEV family. This generality comes at the expense of requiring homogeneous price sensitivity parameters. As we shortly discuss, there is a significant amount of work that studies pricing problems for specific instances of the GEV models, such as the multinomial and nested logit model, under the assumption that the price sensitivities for the products are the same. Furthermore, in many practical applications, customers choose among products that are in the same product category, such as different flavors of yogurt or different types of cereal. In such cases, it is reasonable to expect that the attractiveness of the different products changes in a similar fashion as a function of their prices, resulting in similar price sensitivities across products.
Even when the price sensitivities of the products are the same, the GEV models can still provide significant flexibility in modeling the customer choice process, because these models include many other parameters. For example, consider the generalized nested logit model, which is a member of the GEV family. Let N denote the set of all products and β denote the common price sensitivity of the products. In addition to the price sensitivity parameter, the generalized nested logit model has the parameters {α i : i ∈ N }, {τ k : k ∈ L}, and {σ ik : i ∈ N, k ∈ L} for some generic index set L. If the prices of the products are p = (p i : i ∈ N ), then a customer purchases product i with probability
purchase probabilities are given by the expression above, but our results show that we can efficiently find the prices that maximize this expected profit function. In fact, Corollary 3.2 gives an explicit expression for the optimal prices. In addition, Daly and Bierlaire (2006) show a general approach to generate GEV models by combining known GEV models, and the purchase probabilities under such new GEV models can be even more complicated than the one above. This example illustrates the benefit of establishing results that hold for all GEV models simultaneously.
Literature Review: There is a rich vein of literature on pricing problems under specific instances of the GEV family, but all of these results make use of the specific form of the purchase probabilities under each specific GEV model. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study pricing problems under general GEV models. Hanson and Martin (1996) , Song and Xue (2007) ,
and Dong et al. (2009) study pricing problems under the multinomial logit model. Assuming that the price sensitivities of the products are the same, the authors show that the revenue function is concave in the purchase probabilities of the products. Li and Huh (2011) study pricing problems under the nested logit model when the products in each nest have the same price sensitivity. They show that the optimal prices for the products in each nest have a constant markup, and they prove that the revenue function is concave in the purchase probabilities. All of these papers exploit the structure of the specific GEV model instance to find an explicit formula for the price of each product as a function of the purchase probabilities. This approach fails for arbitrary GEV models, because there is no explicit formula for the prices as a function of purchase probabilities, but, as shown in Section 5, we can still establish the desired concavity property. Gallego and Wang (2014) show that the expected profit function under the nested logit model can have multiple local maxima when the price sensitivities are arbitrary, and they give sufficient conditions on the price sensitivities to ensure unimodality of the objective function. Wang (2012) considers joint assortment and pricing problems under the multinomial logit model with arbitrary price sensitivities, where the goal is to find the subset of products to offer and their corresponding prices. Rayfield et al. (2015) consider the pricing problem under the nested logit model with arbitrary price sensitivities and provide heuristics with performance guarantees. and Li and Huh (2015) focus on pricing problems under the d-level nested logit model with arbitrary price sensitivities. Li and Webster (2015) study pricing problems under the pairwise combinatorial logit model, establish sufficient conditions on the price sensitivities to ensure unimodality of the objective function, and give an algorithm to compute the optimal prices.
Dynamic pricing for network revenue management has also been an active research topic. Computing the optimal policy exactly here is intractable, and much of the research focuses on developing heuristics based on deterministic approximations. Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) , who were among the first to study this problem, develop bounds and heuristics by using a deterministic approximation, which is conceptually the same as the deterministic approximation used in our paper. Liu and van Ryzin (2008) and Zhang and Lu (2013) study deterministic approximations for dynamic pricing problems over a network of resources. In particular, Zhang and Lu (2013) consider the case when customers choose under the multinomial logit model. They use the purchase probabilities of the products as decision variables to formulate the problem as a convex program, but they exploit the specific structure of the choice probabilities under the multinomial logit model, so their proof technique unfortunately does not extend to arbitrary GEV models.
The GEV family of choice models provides a rich class of models to describe complex choice behaviors and substitution patterns. Each GEV model is uniquely defined by a generating function that satisfies certain properties and vice versa. McFadden (1978) is the first to propose the GEV family, and he proves that all GEV models are compatible with the random utility maximization principle, where each customer associates random utilities with the available alternatives and chooses the alternative that provides the largest utility. The author also shows the one-to-one correspondence between the generating function and the probability distribution function for the random utilities. McFadden (1980) discusses the connections between GEV models and other choice models. Daly and Bierlaire (2006) show how to combine generating functions from different GEV models to create a new GEV model. Train (2002) provides an extensive coverage of GEV models and their applications in many domains.
Organization: The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain how we can characterize a GEV model by using a generating function. In the rest of the paper, we consider GEV models with homogeneous prices sensitivities. In Section 3, we consider static pricing problems, and we prove that the markup of the optimal prices is the same for all products, provide an explicit formula for the markup in the optimal solution, and establish comparative statistics describing how the optimal prices change as a function of the unit costs. In Section 4, we consider single-resource dynamic pricing problems and characterize the structure of the optimal policy. In Section 5, we focus on a deterministic approximation for dynamic pricing problems over a network of resources, which is not a convex program, but we show that we can transform this deterministic approximation to a convex program. In particular, we show how to use the purchase probabilities, rather than prices, as the decision variables. We prove that the objective function of the transformed problem is concave in the purchase probabilities and show how to recover the optimal prices from the optimal purchase probabilities. In Section 6, we give computational experiments to demonstrate the computational advantages of the transformed problem. In Section 7, we conclude.
Generalized Extreme Value Models
We describe the family of GEV models that we use to capture the choice process of each customer. We index the products by N = {1, . . . , n}. A GEV model is characterized by a generating
The function G satisfies the following four properties.
(ii) The function G is homogeneous of degree one. In other words, we have
(iv) Using ∂G i i ,...,i k (Y ) to denote the cross partial derivative of the function G with respect
. . , i k are distinct from each other, then we have
Then, for any fixed vector Y ∈ R n + , under the GEV model characterized by the function G, the probability that a customer chooses product i ∈ N is given by
With probability Θ 0 (Y ) = 1 − i∈N Θ i (Y ), a customer leaves without purchasing anything. Maximization: McFadden (1978) shows that if the function G satisfies the four properties described above, then for any fixed vector Y ∈ R n + , the choice probabilities in (1) are compatible with the random utility maximization (RUM) principle. Under the RUM principle, every product, including the no-purchase option, is associated with a random utility. The realization of these random utilities is drawn from a particular probability distribution and is known only to the customer who chooses the alternative that provides the largest utility. More precisely, every function G satisfying the above four properties uniquely defines a random vector ( 0 , 1 , . . . , n ) with an extreme value distribution, where 0 denotes the no-purchase option. If we
Connection to Random Utility
which is the purchase probability of product i under the RUM principle. Note that we can interpret log(Y i ) as the mean utility of product i. The denominator 1 + G(Y ) in (1) reflects our assumption that the mean utility of the no-purchase option is normalized to zero, so Y 0 = 1.
The GEV models allow for correlated utilities, and we can use different generating functions to model different correlation patterns among the random utilities. In the next example, we show that numerous choice models that are commonly used in the operations management and economics literature are specific instances of the GEV models.
Example 2.1 (Specific Instances of GEV Models) The multinomial logit, nested logit, and pairwise combinatorial logit models are all instances of the GEV models. For some generic index set L, consider the function G given by
where for all i ∈ N , k ∈ L, τ k ∈ (0, 1], σ ik ≥ 0, and for all i ∈ N , k∈L σ ik = 1. The function G above satisfies the four properties described at the beginning of this section. Thus, the expression in (1) with this choice of the function G yields a choice model that is consistent with the random utility maximization principle. The choice model that we obtain by using the function G given above is called the generalized nested logit model. Train (2002) discusses how specialized choices of the index set L and the scalars {τ j : j ∈ L} and {σ ik : i ∈ N, k ∈ L} result in well-known choice models. If the set L is the singleton L = {1} and τ 1 = 1, then G(Y ) = i∈N Y i , and the expression in (1) yields the choice probabilities under the multinomial logit model. If, for each
where N g = {i ∈ N : k i = g}, in which case, the expression in (1) yields the choice probabilities under the nested logit model, and k i is known as the nest of product i. If the set L is given
/(2(n − 1)), and the expression in (1) yields the choice probabilities of the pairwise combinatorial logit model.
Although the choice of the function G in Example 2.1 allows us to obtain numerous choice models that are commonly used in the literature, there are other GEV models obtained by using other generating functions. For example, Small (1987) discusses ordered GEV models, Train (2002) describes the heteroskedastic logit model, and formulates the d-level nested logit model. In addition, Daly and Bierlaire (2006) show how to come up with other GEV models by combining existing generating functions of known GEV models. In the next lemma, we give two properties of functions that are homogeneous of degree one. These properties are a consequence of a more general result, known as Euler's formula, but we provide a self-contained proof for completeness. We will use these properties extensively.
Lemma 2.2 (Properties of Generating Functions)
If G is a homogeneous function of degree one, then we have
Proof: Noting that the function G is homogeneous of degree one, we have
Differentiating both sides of this equality with respect to λ, we obtain i∈N
Using the last equality with λ = 1 yields
On the other hand, letting e i ∈ R n denote the unit vector with a one in the i th component, we have
, where the second equality follows because the function G is homogeneous of degree one. So, differentiating both sides of the equality
Using the last equality with λ = 1 yields j∈N Y j ∂G ij (Y ) = 0, as desired.
Static Pricing under Homogeneous Price Sensitivities
We consider pricing problems where the mean utility of a product is a linear function of its prices and we are interested in finding the product prices that maximize the expected profit obtained from a customer. For each product i ∈ N , let p i ∈ R denote the price charged for product i and c i its unit cost. As a function of the price of product i, the mean utility of product i is given by
, where α i ∈ R and β i ∈ R + are constants. Anderson et al. (1992) interpret the parameter α i as a measure of the quality of product i, while β i is the price sensitivity of product i. Throughout the paper, we focus on the case where the price sensitivity parameters for all of the products are the same. We use β ∈ R + to denote the common price sensitivity parameter, so that we have
Noting the connection of the GEV models to the RUM principle discussed in the previous section, the mean utility
follows from the selection probability in (1) that a customer purchases product i with probability
Our goal is to find the prices for the products to maximize the expected profit from each customer, yielding the optimization problem
Since the function G satisfies the four properties at the beginning of Section 2, we have
For the Static problem, we impose a rather mild additional assumption that
that is, the partial derivative is strictly positive whenever every component of Y is positive. This assumption holds for all of the GEV models we are aware of, including the variants discussed in Example 2.1.
Constant Markup for Static Pricing
Let p * denote the optimal solution to the Static problem. In Theorem 3.1, we will show that p * has a constant markup, so p * i − c i = m * for all i ∈ N for some constant m * . Furthermore, we give an explicit formula for the optimal markup m * in terms of the Lambert-W function. Recall that the Lambert-W function is defined as follows: for all x ∈ R + , W (x) is the unique value such that
Using standard calculus, it can be verified that W (x) is increasing and concave in x ∈ R + ; see Corless et al. (1996) . The starting point for our discussion is the expression for the partial derivative of the revenue function. Since
, in which case, using the definition of R(p) in the Static problem, we have
In the next theorem, we use the above derivative expression to show that the optimal prices for the Static problem involves a constant markup for all of the products.
Proof: Note that there exist optimal prices that are finite; the proof is straightforward but tedious, and we defer the details to Appendix A. Since the optimal prices are finite, they satisfy the first order conditions: 
Since the prices are finite at an optimal solution, the first order condition above is necessary.
By Lemma 2.2, we have
for notational brevity, it follows from the above equality that
Without loss of generality, we index the products such that m *
+ by properties of the generating function, the above equality yields
where the first inequality uses the fact that m * j − m * 1 ≤ 0 for all j ∈ N , and the second inequality follows because m * j − m * n ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N . Since the products are indexed such that m * 1 ≥ . . . ≥ m * n , the chain of inequalities above holds as equalities. Therefore, we have
and the desired result follows by noting that m *
The following corollary provides an explicit formula for m * in terms of the Lambert-W function. Since the Lambert-W function is available in most mathematical computation packages, this corollary greatly simplifies the computation of the optimal prices. We simply compute γ as in the corollary and set m * = W (γ e −1 )/β, in which case, the optimal price for product i is m * + c i .
Corollary 3.2 (Explicit Formula for the Optimal Markup) Let the scalar γ be defined by:
Proof: At the optimal solution to the Static problem, we know that all prices are characterized by a constant markup. Thus, we focus on price vectors p such that
, where e ∈ R n is the vector with all components of one. In this case, we can write the objective function of the Static problem as a function of m, which is given by
where the second equality relies on the fact that i∈N
by Lemma 2.2. Thus, we can compute the optimal objective value of the Static problem by maximizing R(m) over all possible values of m.
where the second equality once again uses the fact that 
Comparative Statistics
We give comparative statistics for the optimal prices in the Static problem as a function of the unit costs for the products. In the next lemma, we focus on the case where either the unit cost of one product changes or the unit costs of all products change by the same amount. The first part of the lemma establishes a lower bound on the optimal expected profit as the unit costs increase. The second part shows that the optimal price of a product increases as its unit cost increases, while the optimal prices of all other products decrease. The third part of the lemma shows that the optimal price of every product increases if all the unit costs increase by the same amount. Besides providing economic intuition for the optimal solution to the Static problem, we will use these comparative statistics to characterize the structure of the optimal policy for the single-resource dynamic pricing problem in the next section. To facilitate our exposition, we use e i for the vector with one in the i th component and zeros everywhere else, and we designate e as the vector of all ones. Also, let p * (c) = (p * 1 (c), . . . , p * n (c)) and R * (c) denote the optimal prices and the optimal expected profit, respectively, in the Static problem as a function of the unit product costs c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ).
Proof: Let m * (c) denote the optimal markup as a function of the unit costs of the products.
To establish part (a), note that R * (c) ≥ R * (c + δe i ) ≥ R * (c + δe) follows immediately because c ≤ c + δe i ≤ c + δe, and as the unit costs increase, the optimal expected profits decrease. The last inequality in part (a) follows because
where the first inequality follows because p * (c) may not be optimal when the unit costs are c + δe, and the last inequality follows from the fact that R
and
To establish part (b), by Theorem 3.1 and part (a) of the lemma, we obtain m 
Single-Resource Dynamic Pricing
We consider a firm offering multiple products by using a single resource. We still use N = {1, . . . , n} to denote the set of products. There are T time periods in the selling horizon. The firm dynamically adjusts the prices of the products. Customers arrive into the system one by one. For notational brevity, we assume that one customer arrives at each time period. Depending on the prices charged for the products, customers make a choice among the products according to a GEV model. As in the previous section, the GEV model has homogeneous price sensitivity parameters for the products. The sale of a product generates a revenue equal to the price charged for the product and consumes one unit of the resource. There are C units of resource available at the beginning of the selling horizon. The goal of the firm is to find a pricing policy that maximizes the total expected revenue obtained over the selling horizon. This dynamic pricing problem is studied in Maglaras and Meissner (2006) under a general choice model, where the authors show the connections between dynamic pricing and capacity allocation problems. We study the structural properties of the optimal policy when customers choose according to a GEV model. We use V t (x) to denote the optimal total expected revenue obtained over the time periods {t, . . . , T } given that we have x units of resource at the beginning of time period t. Also, we let ∆V t+1 (x) = V t+1 (x) − V t+1 (x − 1). In this case, we can compute the value functions {V t (·) : t = 1, . . . , T } through the dynamic program
with the boundary condition that V t (0) = 0 and V T +1 (x) = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T and x = 0, . . . , C. If
we have x units of remaining resource at the beginning of time period t, then to compute the optimal prices, we need to solve the optimization problem on the right side of the above equation, which corresponds to the Static problem with unit costs ∆V t+1 (x)e.
We use p * t (x) = (p * 1t (x), . . . , p * nt (x)) to denote the optimal prices to charge for the products when we have x units of remaining resource at the beginning of time period t. The following theorem shows that p * it (x) is decreasing in both x and t, demonstrating intuitive relationships between the optimal prices and the urgency to liquidate the resource inventory. In particular, as we have more resource capacity at a certain time period, the urgency to liquidate becomes more pressing, and we charge lower prices. Also, as we have fewer time periods left until the end of the selling horizon, the urgency to liquidate becomes more pressing, and we charge lower prices.
Theorem 4.1 (Monotonicity of the Optimal Policy) For all i ∈ N and t = 1, . . . , T ,
Proof: Under a general choice model, Talluri and van Ryzin (2005) show that the first differences of the value functions satisfy ∆V t (x) ≥ ∆V t (x + 1) and ∆V t (x) ≥ ∆V t+1 (x) for all t = 1, . . . , T and x = 1, . . . , C. Using p * (c) to denote the optimal solution to the Static problem as a function of the unit costs, it follows that p *
Since ∆V t (x) = ∆V t (x + 1) + δ, we have p * t (x) = p * (∆V t+1 (x + 1) e + δ e). Noting that p * t (x + 1) = p * (∆V t+1 (x + 1) e), by part (c) of Lemma 3.3, we get p * t (x) ≥ p * t (x + 1), giving us the first inequality in the theorem. The second inequality in the theorem follows by using same approach but noting the fact that ∆V t+1 (x) ≥ ∆V t+2 (x).
In the next section, we focus on dynamic pricing problems over a network of resources.
Dynamic Pricing Over a Network of Resources
We consider a firm selling multiple products by using a network of resources. We index the products by N = {1, . . . , n} and the resources by M = {1, . . . , m}. There are T time periods in the selling horizon. The firm dynamically adjusts the prices of the products. Customers arrive into the system one by one. Similar to the previous section, for notational brevity, we assume that there is one customer arrival at each time period. Customers arriving into the system make a choice among the products according to a GEV model that has homogeneous price sensitivity parameters for all products. The sale of a product generates a revenue given by the price of the product and consumes a combination of resources. In particular, the sale of product i consumes a ki units of resource k. There are C k units of resource k at the beginning of the selling horizon. The goal is to find a policy to price the products so as to maximize the total expected revenue obtained over the selling horizon. This pricing problem models the situation faced by an airline operating a set of flight legs and using these flight legs to offer different itineraries; in this case, different itineraries correspond to different products, and the capacity of each resource corresponds to the seating capacity on each flight leg. The model is applicable to hotels and car rental services as well.
Computing an optimal policy for this problem via dynamic programming is computationally intractable because of the curse of dimensionality, since the state variable is an m-dimensional vector that tracks the remaining inventory levels for all m resources. Much of the research in this area thus focuses on developing good heuristics. Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) study this pricing problem and use a deterministic approximation to develop heuristics with performance guarantees. We focus on a similar deterministic approximation, which is based on the assumption that random demands take on their expected values. In addition to Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) , similar deterministic approximations are used by Liu and van Ryzin (2008) and Zhang and Lu (2013) as well. In our deterministic approximation, the decision variables p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) are the prices that we charge for the products. In this case, the total expected demand for product i is given by T Θ i (Y (p)). We consider the deterministic approximation max p∈R n i∈N
The objective function above accounts for the total expected revenue, and the constraint accounts for the total expected capacity consumed on each resource. We refer to the problem above as the price-based deterministic approximation, since the decision variables are the prices. As discussed in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) , there are two uses of this problem. First, its optimal objective value provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected revenue in the dynamic pricing problem and hence also establishes a benchmark to evaluate specific policies. Second, the deterministic approximation can be used to construct heuristic policies for the dynamic pricing problem.
Unfortunately, in the Price-Based problem, the objective function is generally not concave in the prices p, and the feasible region is also not convex, making this problem difficult to solve. However, by expressing the above Price-Based problem in terms of the purchase probabilities (or market shares), we can transform the problem into a convex program. In our transformation, the decision variables q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) correspond to the purchase probabilities of the products, and we let p(q) = (p 1 (q)), . . . , p n (q)) denote the prices that achieve these purchase probabilities. Therefore, the market-share-based deterministic approximation is
The interpretations of the objective function and the first constraint above are similar to those of the Price-Based problem. The last constraint above ensures that the total purchase probability of all products does not exceed one. We will establish the following results for the Market-Share-Based problem. In Theorem 5.1 in Section 5.1, we show that for each q, there exists the unique price vector p(q) that achieves the market shares q, and p(q) is the solution of an unconstrained minimization problem with a strictly convex objective function. So, computing p(q) is tractable. Then, in Theorem 5.4 in Section 5.2, we prove that the objective function in the Market-Share-Based problem q → i∈N T p i (q) q i is concave in q; we also provide an expression for its gradient. Since the constraints in the Market-Share-Based problem are linear in q, we have a convex program. Thus, we can efficiently solve the Market-Share-Based problem by using standard convex optimization methods (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, Ruszczynski 2006) to obtain the optimal purchase probabilities q * and then also compute the corresponding optimal prices p(q * ). Computational results in Section 6 show that solving the Market-Share-Based problem is far superior to directly solving the original Price-Based problem.
Prices as a Function of Purchase Probabilities
We focus on the question of how to compute the prices p(q) = (p 1 (q)), . . . , p n (q)) that are necessary to achieve the given purchase probabilities q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ). The main result of this section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Inverse Mapping) For each q ∈ R n + such that q i > 0 for all i ∈ N and i∈N q i < 1, there exists a unique price vector p(q) such that q i = Θ i (Y (p(q))) for all i ∈ N . Moreover, p(q) is the unique solution to the following strictly convex minimization problem:
The proof of Theorem 5.1 makes use of the two lemmas given below. Throughout this section, all vectors are assumed to be column vectors. For any vector s ∈ R n , s denotes its transpose and will be always be a row vector, and diag(s) denotes an n-by-n diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries correspond to the vector s. Also, let ∇G(Y (s)) denote the gradient vector of the generator function G evaluated at Y (s), and let ∇ 2 G(Y (s)) denote the Hessian matrix of G evaluated at Y (s). Last but not least, we use Θ(Y (s)) ∈ R n to denote an n-dimensional vector whose entries are the selection probabilities Θ 1 (Y (s) ), . . . , Θ n (Y (s)). Fix an arbitrary q ∈ R n + such that q i > 0 for all i and i∈N q i < 1, and let f : R n → R be defined by: for all s ∈ R n ,
The first lemma gives the expressions for the gradient ∇f (s) and the Hessian ∇ 2 f (s).
.
In this case, using the definition of f and differentiating, for all i ∈ N , we obtain ∂f (s)
where the second equality uses the definition of the selection probabilities in (1). The equality above establishes the expression for the gradient f . Letting 1l {·} be the indicator function and differentiating the middle expression above once more, we get
where we use the fact that the derivative of h(x)/g(x) with respect to x is given by the formula
Putting everything together, we have
which is the desired result.
The next lemma shows that certain matrices are positive definite. The proof follows from a standard argument in linear algebra, and the details are in Appendix B. Theorem 5.1 follows from the above two lemmas, and here is the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: For any s ∈ R n , Y i (s i ) = e α i −β s i > 0 for all i ∈ N , which implies 
) is symmetric, and if i = j, its ij th entry is equal to
, which is nonpositive by the property of the generating function G, so all off-diagonal entries of the matrix are nonpositive. Finally, its i th diagonal entry is given by
where the equality follows from Lemma 2.2, and thus, every row sums to zero. Then, by Lemma 5.3, 
and ∇ 2 f (s) is positive definite, so f is strictly convex. The optimal solution p(q) is thus unique, and it is the solution to the first-order condition ∇f (p(q)) = 0, where 0 is the vector of all zeros. In this case, it follows from the expression of the gradient ∇f (p(q)) in Lemma 5.2 that q = Θ (Y (p(q))), which is the desired result.
To summarize, given a vector of purchase probabilities q, the unique price vector p(q) that achieves these purchase probabilities is the unique optimal solution to the strictly convex minimization problem:
Because the objective function in this minimization problem is strictly convex, with its gradient given in Lemma 5.2, and there are no constraints on the decision variables, we can compute p(q) easily using standard convex optimization methods. We emphasize that one might be tempted to set q i = Θ i (Y (p)) for all i ∈ N and solve for p in terms of q in order to compute p(q). However, solving this system of equations directly is difficult. Even showing that there is a unique solution to this system of equations is not straightforward. Theorem 5.1 shows that there is a unique solution to this system of equations, and we can compute the solution by solving an unconstrained convex optimization problem.
Concavity of the Expected Revenue Function and its Gradient
Let R(q) = i∈N p i (q) q i denote the revenue function that is defined in terms of the market shares.
The main result of this section is stated in the following theorem, which shows that R(q) is concave in q and provides an expression for its gradient. Recall that e denotes the vector of all ones.
Theorem 5.4 (Concavity of the Revenue Function in terms of Market Shares) For all q ∈ R n + such that q i > 0 for all i and i∈N q i < 1, the Hessian matrix ∇ 2 R(q) is negative definite
e.
Before we proceed to the proof, we discuss the significance of Theorem 5.4. As noted in the beginning of Section 5, the function p → i∈N p i Θ i (Y (p)) is not necessarily concave in the prices p.
However, the theorem above shows that when we express the problem in terms of market shares q, the revenue function R(q) is concave in q. Using the gradient of the revenue function, we can then immediately solve the Market-Share-Based problem using standard tools from convex programming. As shown in our numerical experiments in the next section, the transformation yields superior solution quality and much faster running times.
Also, we note that the restriction that q i > 0 for all i and i∈N q i < 1 is necessary for the expected revenue function R(q) and its derivatives to be well-defined. To give an example, we consider the multinomial logit model. Under this choice model, the selection probability of product i is
This expected revenue function and its derivatives is well-defined only when q i > 0 for all i ∈ N and i∈N q i < 1.
The proof of Theorem 5.4 makes use of the following three lemmas. The first lemma gives two matrix identities. The proof follows from standard linear algebra and is in Appendix C. Here, we use tr(X) to denote the trace of the matrix X.
Lemma 5.5 (Matrix Inverse) For any matrices X and Z such that X and X + Z are invertible,
The next key ingredient is computing the Jacobian matrix J(q) associated with the vector-valued mapping q → p(q), which is given in the following lemma. To facilitate our exposition, let the matrix B(q) = (B ij (q) : i, j ∈ N ) be defined by: for all i, j ∈ N , B ij (q) =
, and thus,
Lemma 5.6 (Jacobian) The Jacobian matrix J(q) =
Proof: Let f (s) = 1 β log(1 + G(Y (s))) + i∈N q i s i denote the objective function of the optimization problem in Theorem 5.1. By Lemma 5.2, we have ∇f (s) = q − Θ (Y (s)) for all s ∈ R n .
Since p(q) is the unique minimizer of f , it follows that for all i ∈ N ,
Taking the derivative of the above equation with respect to q j , we obtain that for all i, j ∈ N ,
: i, ∈ N , and thus, the expression − ∈N
is the inner product between the i th row of the Hessian matrix ∇ 2 f (p(q)) and the j th column of the Jacobian matrix J(q). Letting I denote the n-by-n identity matrix, we can write the above system of equations in matrix notation as
Note that, by definition, Θ(Y (p(q))) = q, and thus, it follows from Lemma 5.2 that
where the last equality follows from the definition of B(q) in (2). Since ∇ 2 f (·) is positive definite, and thus, invertible, the desired result follows by the fact that
The next lemma establishes useful properties of the matrix B(q), allowing us to simplify the expression for its inverse.
Lemma 5.7 (Properties of the Matrix B(q)) For all q ∈ R n + such that q i > 0 for all i and i∈N q i < 1, B(q) is symmetric positive semidefinite, B(q) e = 0, (diag(q) + B(q)) −1 q = e, and
Proof: By definition, B(q) is symmetric. Moreover, by Lemma 2.2, each row of this matrix sums to zero, so B(q) e = 0; the argument here is exactly the same as the one in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
In addition, the off-diagonal entries of B(q) are nonpositive, because G is a generating function, so we have that B(q) is also positive semidefinite by Lemma 5.3. In this case, because q i > 0 for all i, the matrix diag(q) + B(q) is invertible, so by Lemma 5.5(a),
Multiplying the above equality above by q and using the fact that diag(q) −1 q = e and B(q)e = 0, we obtain (diag(q) + B(q)) −1 q = e − (I + diag(q) −1 B(q)) −1 diag(q) −1 B(q) e = e, which is the desired result. The last part follows immediately from taking the transpose.
We are ready to give the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4: Since R(q) = i∈N p i (q)q i , it follows that
where the last equality follows from Lemma 5.6. Becauseis a rank one matrix, it follows from
where the last equality follows from Lemma 5.7, which shows that diag(q) + B(q) −1 q = e and q diag(q) + B(q) −1 = e . Then, applying Lemma 5.7 again, we get
which is the desired expression for ∇R(q).
Writing the gradient componentwise, we have
differentiating it with respect to q j , we obtain
We write the last equality in matrix notation as
where the last equality follows from the expression for the Jacobian matrix in Lemma 5.6. The above equality shows that ∇ 2 R(q) is negative definite, because diag(q) −+ B(q) is positive definite by Lemma 5.3, so its inverse is also positive definite.
The results that we present in this section indicate that any optimization problem that maximizes the expected revenue subject to constraints that are convex in the market shares of the products can be solved efficiently, as long as customers choose under a GEV model with homogeneous price sensitivities. It is often practical to assume such constraints in real-world applications. For example, a retailer may be interested in finding revenue-maximizing prices subject to a constraint that the market share of some products should exceed certain thresholds. Gilbride et al. (2008) , Inderst and Shaffer (2010) , and Calzolari and Denicol (2013) describe applications that use these constraints on the market shares.
Computational Experiments
We provide computational experiments for dynamic pricing problems over a network of resources;
in particular, we consider the Price-Based problem discussed in Section 5. We compare two approaches to obtain a good solution to the Price-Based problem. In the first approach, we solve the Price-Based problem directly by optimizing over the prices p. The objective function of this problem is generally not concave in p, so this approach may not yield the globally optimal prices.
We use the non-convex optimization routine fmincon in Matlab to obtain a good solution to the Price-Based problem. We call this approach P-opt to emphasize that we try to compute the optimal prices directly.
In the second approach, we transform the Price-Based problem into the equivalent Market-Share-Based problem whose objective function is concave in the purchase probabilities q and whose feasible region is defined by linear constraints in q. We refer to this approach as Q-opt to emphasize that we compute the optimal purchase probabilities in this approach. In Section 5.2, we show that we can efficiently compute the gradient of the objective function of the Market-Share-Based problem. Therefore, we can determine the globally optimal purchase probabilities using standard convex programming methods, and in our computational experiments, we use the primal-dual algorithm for convex programs; see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004) . In Section 5.1, we show how to compute the prices p(q) that are necessary to achieve given purchase probabilities q. Thus, after computing the globally optimal purchase probabilities, we can compute the optimal prices for the products.
Note that the solution under Q-opt is always globally optimal, while P-opt may generate suboptimal solutions. Our computational experiments compare the quality of the solutions obtained by P-opt and Q-opt over a large number of test problems.
Generation of Test Problems:
In our computational experiments, we generate a large number of test problems. In all our test problems, we assume that the choice process of the customers is governed by the pairwise combinatorial logit model, a member of the GEV family, whose
. Note that this generating function differs from the one corresponding to the pairwise combinatorial logit model in Example 2.1 by a constant factor. If we multiply a generating function by a constant, then the generating function still satisfies the properties at the beginning of Section 2. We use the following strategy to generate our test problems. The set of products is N = {1, . . . , n}, and the set of resources is M = {1, . . . , m}. To come up with the parameters of the pairwise combinatorial logit model, we sample τ (i,j) from the uniform distribution over [0.2, 1] for all i, j ∈ N with i = j.
Recalling that the mean utility of product i is given by α i − β p i , to come up with (α 1 , . . . , α n ) and β, we sample α i from the uniform distribution over [−2, 2] for all i ∈ N , and we sample β from the uniform distribution over [1, 4] . In all our test problems, we normalize the length of the selling horizon to T = 100. For each product i, we randomly choose a resource ν i and set a ν i ,i = 1. For each other resource k ∈ M \ {ν i }, we set a ki = 1 with probability ζ and a ki = 0 with probability 1 − ζ, where ζ is a parameter that we vary. In this way, the expected number of resources used by a product is given by 1 + (m − 1) ζ, and we vary ζ to control the expected number of resources used by a product. To come up with the capacities for the resources, we solve the unconstrained pricing problem max p∈R n { i∈N T p i q i (Y (p))} using the explicit formula given in Section 3, which computes the optimal prices under the assumption that there is infinite capacity for the resources. Using p U N C to denote an optimal solution to the unconstrained problem, we set the capacity of resource k as
, where κ is another parameter that we vary to control the tightness of the resource capacities. Thus, the capacity of resource k is a κ fraction of the total expected capacity consumed when we charge the optimal prices p U N C in the unconstrained problem. We vary the number of resources m and the number of products n correspond to the smallest and the largest problem instances, respectively. We vary the parameter ζ over ζ ∈ {0.02, 0.2} and the parameter κ over κ ∈ {0.5, 0.8}. This computational setup yields 32 parameter combinations for (m, n, ζ, κ). In each parameter combination, we generate 100 test problems by using the approach just described.
Computational Results: We show our computational results in Table 1 . The first column in this table shows the parameter combinations (m, n, ζ, κ). Considering the 100 test problems that we generate for a particular parameter combination, the second column shows the number of problem instances where the objective values provided by P-opt and Q-opt differ by less than 1%.
In other words, noting that Q-opt computes the globally optimal prices, the second column shows the number of problem instances where the optimality gap of P-opt is below 1%. Similarly, the third, fourth, and fifth columns show the number of problem instances where the optimality gap of P-opt is below 5%, 10% and 25%, respectively. The sixth column shows the number of problem instances where the optimality gap of P-opt is above 25%. The seventh column shows the average CPU runtime (in seconds) for Q-opt, whereas the eighth column shows the average CPU runtime for P-opt. The average here is computed over all 100 test problems in a parameter combination. Since P-opt obtains only a locally optimal solution, we initialize P-opt with three different prices and pick the best solution obtained by using one of the three different initial prices. The CPU runtime for P-opt corresponds to the total CPU runtime for the three initial prices.
Our computational results indicate that the optimality gap of P-opt is below 1% in about 65%
of the problem instances. However, there are many problem instances where the optimality gap of P-opt can be substantial. In about 22% of the problem instances, the optimality gap of P-opt exceeds 25%. Generally speaking, P-opt is unreliable, because, although it can obtain high-quality solutions in certain problem instances, there are also many problem instances where P-opt gets stuck at severely suboptimal prices. Q-opt provides advantages over P-opt in terms of CPU runtimes as well. In every parameter combination, the average CPU runtime for Q-opt is always smaller than that of P-opt. Over all of our test problems, the average CPU runtime for Q-opt is 5.44 seconds, whereas the average CPU runtime for P-opt is 38.28 seconds.
Conclusions
We considered pricing problems under GEV models with homogeneous price sensitivity parameters for the products. For the static pricing problem, we showed that the optimal prices have a constant markup and provided an explicit formula for the optimal markup. For the single-resource dynamic pricing problems, we showed that as we have more resource inventory or as we have fewer time periods left until the end of the selling horizon, the prices charged by the optimal policy decrease.
For dynamic pricing problems over a network of resources, we showed that we can transform a standard price-based deterministic approximation into an equivalent market-share-based problem with a concave objective function and linear constraints.
Our research unifies some of the pricing results that were discovered under special cases of the GEV model, such as the multinomial logit and nested logit models. The value of our results derives from the fact that they hold under any arbitrary GEV model. For instance, to our knowledge, there has been no attempt to solve the deterministic approximation for the pricing problem over a network of resources when the choices of the customers are governed by the pairwise combinatorial logit model, and our computational experiments demonstrate that trying to compute the optimal prices directly may result in severely suboptimal prices. We expect similar observations to hold under other choice models.
The generality of our results comes at the cost of assuming that the price sensitivity parameters of the products are identical. This assumption is reasonable, particularly when customers choose among the products in the same category so that they display similar sensitivities towards the 75 78 22 5.44 38.28 Table 1 Numerical results for Q-opt and P-opt.
prices of all of the products. An important avenue for research is to investigate to what extent our results can be extended to non-homogeneous price sensitivity parameters. This extension seems to be rather nontrivial. Another interesting avenue for research is to consider the case where the mean utilities of the products depend on their prices through a homogeneous price sensitivity parameter, but instead of making pricing decisions, we make assortment optimization decisions, where we decide which set of products to offer. The assortment optimization problem has a combinatorial nature, and it appears to need an entirely new line of attack.
Appendix A: Finiteness of the Optimal Prices
In this section, we show that the optimal prices in the Static problem are finite. In the next lemma, we begin by showing that if we increase the prices of a group of products, then the purchase probability of each product that is not in the group increases. Furthermore, letting Θ 0 (Y (p)) be the probability of no purchase when we charge the prices p for the products, if we increase the prices of a group of products, then the no-purchase probability increases as well.
Lemma A.1 For some M ⊂ N , assume that the pricesp = (p 1 , . . . ,p n ) andp = (p 1 , . . . ,p n ) satisfŷ Here is the proof of the finiteness of the optimal prices.
Proof: Assume that p * is an optimal solution to the Static problem. Let N − = {i ∈ N : p
